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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
fails then there is no consent. 17 The report of a commission
appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1955
points out that English law looks to consent as expressed and
will not allow the parties to derogate privately from their public
professions. 18 Even a private written agreement entered into
before marriage that the parties will never live together does not
render an English marriage invalid.' 9 The report emphasizes the
obvious abuses that may result from a recognition of simulated or
conditional consent as a basis of nullity. It does not seem illogical
to assume that had the framers of our Code intended that a seri-
ous, public manifestation of consent, by one of sound mind and
in full control of his faculties, could be overcome by proof of
an absence of actual internal consent they would have so stated
in clear explicit terms. On the other hand it would seem logical
that where a party was insane, under the influence of narcotics
or alcohol, or was otherwise not in control of his mental facul-
ties, a finding of no consent would be within the intent of
Article 90 even though there was a public manifestation of
consent.
It does not appear that there is a basis within Article 90 for
finding an absence of consent in this case. Neither is there a
basis for finding that the consent was not freely given if we look
only to the three conditions listed in Article 91. Should our courts
hold that the three conditions listed in Article 91 are not exclu-
sive they will then be faced with the problem of where to draw
the line. This writer suggests that expansion of the conditions
listed in Article 91 is a legislative matter and if social conditions
today indicate a need to expand the list of causes that will render
consent to marriage unfree, the expansion should be made by
the legislature and not the judiciary.
Roy L. Wood
SUFFICIENT MEANS UNDER ARTICLE 160 OF THE
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
Article 160 reads: "When the wife has not been at fault, and
she has not sufficient means for her support, the court may allow
her, out of the property and earnings of her husband, alimony
which shall not exceed one-third of his income ... This alimony
17. Id. at 556.
18. THE REPORT OF A COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE ARCHBISHOPS OF CAN,-




shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if the
wife remarries."1 This Note will consider the construction and
application given this article in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
The leading case interpreting Article 160 is Smith v. Smith.2
The court in this case held that a wife with $20,000.00 capital in
war bonds, interest-bearing notes, and an automobile had suffi-
cient means. The court said:
"In other words, under Article 160, the Court is not concerned
with the wife's income as such, but only with the means she
has, including income, and whether they are sufficient for
her maintenance.... Maintenance may be said to include pri-
marily food, shelter, and clothing.... It is not to be inferred
from this that the wife must be practically destitute before
she can act. In fact the language of Article 160 implies the
opposite because it expressly stipulates that it is in case she
has not sufficient means that she can apply for the alimony
from which it follows that she may have some means.... To
what extent the wife should be made to use up her capital be-
fore applying for the alimony is a matter with which we are
not concerned at the moment. . . . That again would be a
question of fact left to the discretion of the trial judge for
decision." ...
Subsequent cases of the Louisiana Supreme Court have pro-
vided further examples of what will be considered "sufficient
means."
The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Harris4 reversed the trial
court's holding that a wife with $6,600.00 in a savings account
plus $150.00 per month income had sufficient means for her sup-
port, and thus was not entitled to alimony. The court quoted from
Fortier v. Gelpi, which said:
"The test by which the Court must be guided in such cases in
fixing the amount of alimony or pension is not what it takes
to support the divorced wife in the manner in which she is ac-
customed to live, but what will provide her with 'sufficient
means for her maintenance'." 5
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 160 (as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 48). The word
support read as maintenance before the 1964 amendment. In Burris v. Burris,
197 So.2d 89 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), the court said that they could see no dif-
ference in the two words and that they believed the legislature intended no dif-:
ference in meaning.
2. 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950).
3. Id. at 654, 47 So.2d at 35.
4. 225 La. 320, 72 So.2d 746 (1954).
5. 195 La. 449, 456, 197 So.2d 138, 140 (1940).
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It would appear from this that what is "sufficient means for
maintenance" would be the same for every wife. However, one
gets the impression from reading the cases that the courts do
look to some extent to the status of the wife. For example, they
would be willing to allow more for food, shelter, and clothing for
the wife of a millionaire than for the wife of a common laborer.
It should be stressed that this is merely the impression of the
writer and that the courts have repeatedly said that she is not
entitled to support in the manner in which she is accustomed to
liveA
In Stabler v. Stabler,7 the court followed Smith v. Smith,8 and
held that assets totaling $20,000.00 constituted sufficient means.
The wife contended that the rule of the Smith case was inappli-
cable because the means involved in that case were derived from
the partition of the community, whereas the means involved in
Stabler were her separate property. It was argued that the deci-
sion of the Smith case was based on the fact that it would be in-
equitable to cause the husband to deplete his share of the com-
munity while allowing the wife to keep her share intact. The
court rejected this argument, but did not elaborate on its rea-
sons.9 Since Article 160 requires only "sufficient means" and
makes no mention of the source of the means, it would seem that
the court was correct in rejecting her contention. 0
One point which is not in itself a factor in determining suffi-
cient means, but which is important at the appellate court level
is the discretion of the trial court. It is often said that the
amount necessary for the maintenance of the divorced wife is a
6. See also Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237 La. 1032, 112 So.2d 702 (1959);
Martin v. Lewis, 236 La. 751, 109 So.2d 81 (1959) ; Rabun v. Rabun, 232 La.
1004, 95 So.2d 635 (1957) ; Stabler v. Stabler, 226 La. 70, 75 So.2d 12 (1954) ;
Wilmot v. Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So.2d 321 (1953) ; Smith v. Smith, 217 La.
646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950) ; Matheny v. Matheny, 205 La. 869, 18 So.2d 324 (1944).
7. 226 La. 70, 75 So.2d 12 (1954).
8. 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950). See text accompanying note 3 supra.
9. The attorney for the wife raised this contention, but the court, without
discussing the point, held that she was not entitled to alimony.
10. For other Supreme Court cases which have considered sufficient means
under Article 160 of the Louisiana Civil Code, see Martin v. Lewis, 236 La. 751,
109 So.2d 81 (1959) (wife with $30,000.00 assets in the form of cash, notes, stock,
and a house held to have such means as to allow a reduction in alimony from
$600.00 to $300.00) ; Rabun v. Rabun, 232 La. 1004, 95 So.2d 635 (1957) (wife
with net assets of $11,000.00 plus an income of $125.00 per month held to be
with sufficient means); Howell v. Howell, 229 La. 310, 85 So.2d 885 (1956)
(wife with a house valued at $11,500.00 and an income of from $4,500.00 to
$4,700.00 a year held to have sufficient means). It has also been held that the
wife carries the burden of proving insufficient means. Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237
La. 1032, 112 So.2d 704 (1959). The only evidence offered was that it would take
$30.00 per week to support her in the manner to which she was accustomed; this
was held insufficient to meet her 'burden of proof.
[Vol. XXIX
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question of fact left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and
that his decision will be overturned only if he abuses this discre-
tion." But the question remains as to just how much weight the
appellate court will give to the decision of the trial court; or, in
other words, what amounts to an abuse of his discretion. The
court in Fruehan v. Fruehan2 upheld the trial court's decision
that $13,000.00 in cash and interest bearing notes constituted
sufficient means and said it was important to note that in other
cases" the trial court's decision had been upheld. In Radar v.
Radar,1 4 the court said, in affirming the trial court's award of
award of $120.00 a month alimony, they would have set the
amount higher, but refused to do so out of respect for the deci-
sion of the trial judge whose function it was to determine in his
sound discretion the amount necessary for maintenance. The
First Circuit Court of Appeal said in Burris v. Burris- that the
trial judge's decision should not be disturbed unless there was
manifest error. The court also stated that they believed the trial
judge had abused his discretion in allowing alimony to a wife
with a take home pay of $203.10 a month plus $35.00 a month
income from rental property, valued at from $3,500.00 to
$5,000.00.'
The ease with which the assets can be converted into cash is
11. Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950); Weaver v. Burks,
211 La. 913, 31 So.2d 17 (1947) ; Matheny v. Matheny, 205 La. 869, 18 So.2d
324 (1944) ; Gerstner v. Stringer, 205 La. 791, 18 So.2d 195 (1944) ; Jones v.
Jones, 200 La. 911, 9 So.2d 227 (1942); Street v. Street, 205 So.2d 839 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1967) ; Lucas v. Lucas, 157 So.2d 615 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ;
Fruehan v. Fruehan, 153 So.2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Calloway v. Calloway,
139 So.2d 55 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
12. 153 So.2d 75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
13. Calloway v. Calloway, 139 So.2d 55 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). The court
allowed the wife $200.00 a month where the husband's take home pay was $686.00
per month and her needs were shown to be $171.30 a month. The wife had almost
no income, and no mention was made of means. Roberts v. Roberts, 145 So.2d
669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). The court held that $5,200.00 equity in a double
cottage was not sufficient means and the wife was entitled to alimony.
14. 126 So.2d 189 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). Here the husband had a net in-
come of $14,880.00 per year, and the only assets of the wife were an automobile
and $40.00 per week income. She had received $55,000.00 from the estate of her
first husband, but it had been dissipated.
15. 197 So.2d 89 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
16. For Supreme Court cases reversing or amending the trial court's decision
as to the amount of or eligibility for alimony, see Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237 La.
1032, 112 So.2d 702 (1959) ; Martin v. Lewis, 236 La. 751, 109 So.2d 81 (1959) ;
Brown v. Harris, 235 La. 320, 72 So.2d 746 (1.954) ; Stabler v. Stabler, 226 La.
70, 75 So.2d 12 (1954) ; Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950). See also
Cox v. Cox, 199 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) and Misko v. Capuder, 147
So.2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The Cox case reversed the trial court and
allowed alimony to a wife with property worth $22,000.00 and an income of $120.00
per month. In Misko v. Capuder, the court reversed the trial court and held that
the wife was not entitled to alimony where her own testimony showed her expenses
to be less than her income.
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one factor which the trial court and the appellate court may both
consider. It has been suggested that the liquid character of the
assets involved in Smith v. Smith17 may have been an important
element in the decision of that case.18 In Cox v. Coxl9 the court
allowed alimony in the amount of one-third of the husband's in-
come minus the amount the wife would receive if she invested
the value of her capital. Her assets consisted of property worth
$22,000.00 plus an income of $120.00 per month. The court dis-
tinguished Smith v. Smith, saying the capital in that case was
either liquid or easily convertible into cash. The wife's capital in
Cox, however, was not liquid or easily convertible into cash. The
court, therefore, felt it would be more equitable to debit the prop-
erty to her under the formula of the case of Roberts v. Roberts2 0
than to require her to divest herself of interest in the property
before allowing alimony.2 1
In Roberts the court, after finding the wife to be in need, al-
lowed her one-third of the husband's income minus the theoret-
ical income she would receive from interest if she invested the
total amount of her assets.2 2 The wife in Derussy v. Derussy 23
contended that she was entitled to alimony under the rule of the
Roberts case even though she had $54,000.00 assets. In rejecting
her contention the court made it clear that the rule of those cases
applied only in determining the amount of alimony the wife is
entitled to after she has been found to be in need and was not a
factor in determining whether she had sufficient means for her
maintenance.
The courts, through the reasoning of cases such as Cox and
Montz v. Montz2 4 seem to be shifting the focus from means to
income. They are apparently saying that, at least in some cases,
it does not matter how much capital the divorced wife has; but
17. 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950).
18. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-
Persons, 11 LA. L. REV. 168, 173 (1951).
19. 199 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967). See also Montz v. Montz, 209
So.2d 799 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), where the court, in allowing alimony to a
divorced wife with an $18,000.00 mortgage-free house and $6,000.00 equity in
certain stocks from which she had no income, considered the theoretical monthly
income from the wife's capital as the basis of determining the amount.
20. 145 So.2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
21. It should be noted that this is a court of appeal case and seems to be
contra to the Supreme Court's decision in Stabler v. Stabler, 226 La. 70, 75 So.2d
12 (1954), where a wife with property worth $20,000.00 and only a small income
was held not entitled to alimony.
22. See Vedenne v. Vedenne, 163 So.2d 853 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
23. 175 So.2d 15 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
24. Montz v. Montz, 209 So.2d 799 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) ; Cox v. Cox,
199 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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only how much income she can theoretically derive from her
capital. Article 160, however, makes no mention of the wife's in-
come. The test under that article is simply, does the wife have
"sufficient means." Income is only one type of means. It may be
that the method the court used in Cox and Montz in determining
whether the wife has sufficient means is more equitable where her
assets are not easily convertible into cash; but that is a matter
for the legislature to determine, and it is not the function of the
court to bring about this change. It is submitted that it is the
duty of the courts to determine whether the wife is without such
means as will entitle her to alimony and it is suggested that they
have gone beyond their function in the Cox and Montz cases. The
formula used in those cases should be applied only in determining
the amount of alimony the wife is entitled to after she has been
found to be in need and should not be applied in determining
whether she is in need.
Another question which arises is can a divorced wife who is
being supported by her parents or the parents of her ex-husband
be considered to be without sufficient means for her support?
In Simon v. Simon- the husband argued that the financial abil-
ity of a mother should be considered as a factor in determining
whether the divorced wife has sufficient means. He relied on
Stabler v. Stabler26 but in rejecting his contention, the court said
that in the Stabler case it was found that the wife and not the
mother actually owned the property and received the rents. In
Hicks v. Hicks27 the court said, in allowing alimony, that the fact
that her father provided her with necessities does not relieve the
husband of his obligation.28
A factor which the courts have never mentioned, but which
should be considered here is the shrinking purchasing power of
the dollar. 29 Should this be a justifiable basis for distinguishing
cases of today from 1950 cases where similar dollar amounts are
concerned? It is submitted that this should not be a factor be-
cause decrease in the value of the dollar is shown directly in the
increase in price of goods. Since the divorced wife must show
25. 127 So.2d 769 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
26. 226 La. 70, 75 So.2d 12 (1954). See text accompanlying note 7 supra.
27. 147 So.2d 750 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
28. See Laughman v. Laughman, 170 So.2d 207 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964),
where the court did consider the fact that the divorced wife was living with her
ex-husband's mother when the court was balancing the needs of the wife against
the husband's ability to pay.
29. U.S. News and World Report, October 7, 1968, Vol. 65, No. 15, p. 78. If




what her needs are in order to receive alimony, 30 inflation will
necessarily though not expressly be brought out in this proof.
A factor closely related to the issue of whether the wife has
sufficient means is the ability of the husband to pay. It should
be noted that this is important only after the wife has already
been found to be in need and therefore entitled to alimony. 31 It is
mentioned here only because the courts often fail to make this
clear. It is merely a limiting factor based on the common sense
rule that there is no reason to award the divorced wife a judg-
ment of alimony that the husband cannot pay.
Just how far a wife must deplete her capital before she is en-
titled to alimony is a question which cannot be answered directly
from our jurisprudence. It is a question of fact to be decided in
each case.32 In some cases $20,000.00 has been held to be suffi-
cient means, 3 while in other cases it has been held not to be.
Generally a wife with less than $6,000.00 capital is considered to
be without sufficient means. 34 Since no sharp dividing line can
be drawn one can only determine which factors the courts con-
sider most important. Appellate courts are inclined to follow the
decision of the trial court, but no set rule can be deduced from
the cases.3 5 There is some evidence that the courts are willing to
consider whether the assets are easily convertible into cash.3 6 The
fact that the wife is not in need because her needs are being pro-
vided by her parents or the parents of her divorced husband does
not relieve the husband of his obligation to pay alimony.3 7 A re-
lated factor is the ability of the husband to pay, but it should be
noted that this comes into play only after the wife has been found
to be in need and is not a consideration in determining whether
she is in need .3
30. Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237 La. 1032, 112 So.2d 702 (1959). See text
accompanying note 10 8upra.
31. Laughman v. Laughman, 170 So.2d 207 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) ; Harris
v. Harris, 127 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
32. Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950). See text accompanying
note 2 supra.
33. Id. Stabler v. Stabler, 226 La. 70, 75 So.2d 12 (1954). See text ac-
companying note 7 supra.
34. Roberts v. Roberts, 145 So.2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Loe v. Loe,
131 So.2d 106 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
35. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
36. Montz v. Montz, 209 So.2d 799 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) ; Cox v. Cox,
199 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
37. Hicks v. Hicks, 147 So.2d 750 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). See text
accompanying note 25 supra. Simon v. Simon, 127 So.2d 769 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961). See text accompanying note 27 supra.
38. Laughman v. Laughman, 170 So.2d 207 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) ; Harris




The rule of Smith v. Smith39 has proven difficult to adminis-
ter. One writer has suggested that it would be more workable to
allow the wife one-third of the husband's income and subtract
from this the amount of interest she would receive if she invest-
ed the total amount of her capital.4° This rule would be easier to
administer and there is some indication that the courts are will-
ing to follow it when the assets are not easily convertible into
cash. 41 However, where the assets are easily convertible into
cash, the courts will probably continue to decide each case on its
particular facts. It is submitted that the ease of conversion into
cash should not be a factor under our present legislation since
this shifts the emphasis to "'income" and not to "means" as re-
quired by Article 160.
Charles W. Wilson III
39. 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950). See text accompanying note 3 supra.
40. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term-
Persons, 23 LA. L. REV. 247, 251 (1963).
41. See Montz v. Montz, 209 So.2d 799 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) ; Cox v.
Cox, 199 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
